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Abstract
This dissertation includes two chapters.
The first chapter studies the labor market effect of the college expansion policy in
China. In 1999, the Chinese government embarked on a program to increase the entry
class to tertiary education by 42% from the previous year; the college admission rate
stayed at the higher level since then. The expansion of college education represents a
large and exogenous increase in supply of the college graduates to the labor market. This
paper identifies the key role of the relative college labor supply in driving the changes of
college wage premium after the expansion program. Assuming imperfect substitutability
of workers in different education and age groups, I propose an overlapping-generation
model with endogenous educational choice to account for college premium trends in
distinct demographic groups. The estimation results provide the basis for evaluating
the welfare effects of the college expansion in different subgroups.
In the second chapter, which is co-authored with Huo Zhen, we try to understand the
excess consumption volatility in the emerging countries. In emerging markets, business
cycles are characterized by higher consumption volatility relative to output and strongly
counter-cyclical current accounts. Meanwhile, agents in emerging countries face higher
uncertainty in forecasting economic fundamentals. We build a general equilibrium busi-
ness cycle model with heterogeneous income profiles and imperfect information. Agents
observe their income to learn the growth rate of their individual human capital and
the growth rate of the aggregate economy. Due to information frictions, a shock to the
growth rate of the aggregate economy will be partly attributed to the growth rate of
agents’ own human capital, the latter of which has more persistent effects on agents’
life-time income. As a result, the economy features higher consumption volatility than
the output. Quantitatively, we find that the model can successfully explain the exces-
sive volatility of consumption and generate a strongly negative correlation between the
trade balance and output for a wide range of TFP and income processes.
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Chapter 1
China’s College Expansion
Policy: Ability Selection and
Labor Market Effects
1.1 Introduction
In June 1999, the State Council of China decided to increase the entry class to tertiary
education by 42% from previous year mainly by expanding the class size at existing
universities, and the admission rate stayed at this higher level since then. This paper
assesses the role of supply, driven by the exogenous college expansion policy, in account-
ing for the large change in the returns to college education over different subgroups. The
various trends of changing returns to college education in different age and residential
groups motivates my assumption of imperfect substitutability between different age and
education groups in production, and my estimation of the elasticities are comparable
with the estimates by [1] and [2]. To further account for the differential dynamics of
the college premium across age and residential groups, and to evaluate the welfare gain
or loss of the college expansion policy, I propose an overlapping-generation model with
endogenous college education choice. And in the end, I conduct counter-factual analysis
and solve for the optimal college expansion size.
As documented by many literatures, the wage of college graduates compared to
1
2high school graduates increased dramatically after the opening up in 1978. However, a
remarkable trend in the China’s labor market in the recent years is the overall declining
college premium, and this is especially phenomenal among the young college graduates.
Using a longitudinal data set China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) that include
26,000 individuals in eleven provinces of China, I documented the fact that the college
premium for the young graduates (21-25 years old) begin to decrease immediately after
the first cohorts of college students after the 1999 college expansion policy graduated in
2003, while the college premium for the older cohorts kept on growing until late 2000s.
The panel data drawn from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) also allow
me to separately identify the extent to which the life-cycle earnings profile is determined
by the curvature of the working-experience accumulation versus the changing efficiency
of the labor input.
To account for the divergent college premium trends for different age groups, I build
a heterogeneous-agent model with imperfect substitutability of workers in different edu-
cation and age groups. The production technology in my model is based on the seminal
analysis of [2], which explains the diverging trends of college premiums for old and young
workers by a model of imperfect substitution between different age workers with same
education. In particular, they segregate the labor inputs by five-year age groups and
education groups. For each age group, they separately estimate the college premiums,
and calculate the corresponding relative college labor supply by a ratio of weighted sum
of hours worked by equivalent college and high school workers.1 Adopting a similar
strategy for measuring the effective supply of college labor and college premium, I could
estimate the demand elasticity of substitution between workers with the same education
in different age groups, and the elasticity of substitution between college and high school
laborers. The estimated elasticity of substitution between college and high school labor
is in the range of 1.1 to 1.9, comparable to the estimations by [1] and [2].2 And my
estimation of elasticity of substitution between different age groups are in the range of
1 They divided workers into five educational groups: high school dropouts, high school graduates,
workers with some college, college graduates, and workers with a postgraduate degree, then calculate
the total supply of high-school and college equivalent labor by a weighted sum of different education
groups’ total annual hours, the weight being the regression coefficients of each group’s average wage on
the average wages of high school and college graduates.
2 By comparison, [1] report an estimate of elasticity at 1.4 and the estimates from [2] is in the range
of 1.1-1.6.
34.4 to 7.6, generally higher than the estimates from [2].
In order to analyse the effect of the college expansion policy on residential groups
with different financial resources and ability distributions,3 I further include the mech-
anism of college education choice with heterogeneity in abilities and initial assets. At
high school graduation, individuals are endowed with abilities that will affect their labor
earnings through effective labor inputs and the chance of access to higher education.
They are also endowed with different initial assets. The ability threshold to college
education is exogenously determined by the government policy, and the expansion of
college entry class is equivalent to decreasing the college entry ability threshold if we
assume a constant ability distribution over time.
The huge exogenous college expansion will induce two channels that affect the college
wage premiums. Firstly, the increase in the relative college labor supply will decrease the
relative college labor price. Secondly, the decrease in the ability threshold for college
entry will affect both the average ability of college and high-school labor, and that
will change the effective labor supply in both education groups. The endogenous college
education choice could correspond to both of the above channels, where after the college
expansion policy was announced, individuals perfectly expect the potential decrease in
college premium out of the first supply force, and make their college education choice
on their initial wealth and ability levels accordingly.
The dynamic model and numerical solutions could correspond to the evolution of the
labor market over the recent years. The overall college premiums constantly increased
initially; the college expansion exogenously increased the supply of young college grad-
uates and drove down the wage for inexperienced graduates while the wage for prime
age graduates continues to rise.
From a policy perspective, the model can be used to analyse the welfare effects
of the college expansion policy on different subgroups. The counter-factual analysis
on an alternative policy of limiting the growth of the higher education sector lay the
foundation for a policy analysis of the development of higher education in China as well
as other rapidly developing countries.
3 See documented evidence in Section 1.2.2
4Related Literature My paper is closely related to the literature of the labor supply
effects on the wage structure, such as the cohort effects in [3], changes in college educa-
tion by age groups and cohorts in [1] and [2], and changes in return to experiences in [4].
However, instead of a clear exogenous supply change, all of the above studies consider
some endogenous response, such as the schooling and birth choice, to the underlying
social-economic factors. This paper features a dramatic exogenous policy change, as a
sharp identification strategy, to estimate the production demand elasticities on different
categories of labor input. As a result, the estimated elasticities are generally comparable
with the previous literature, with a slightly higher elasticities for different age groups.
The second strand of research is on the structural model of higher education choice
with heterogeneous ability, such as [5] and [6], where students differ in ability and
family income, and school enrolment decisions are made with perfect information. My
model builds on the framework and combines it with heterogeneous income profiles
(HIP) assumptions, as in [7], where workers with different abilities have various income
growth rates, to study how ability selection affects measured college wage premiums.
Finally, the work is motivated by various empirical studies on the evolutionary poli-
cies on education sectors, such as [8] and [9], and [10] as well as empirical estimates of
the education returns in China for recent years, as in [11], [12], and [13].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data and
discusses the background of China’s tertiary education evolution system as well as the
college expansion policy, and explains why the policy might affect different residen-
tial subgroups differently. Section 1.3 sets up the two-sector economy and establishes
the key variables of elasticities that need to be estimated from microlevel data. Sec-
tion 1.4 illustrates the strong relationship between the relative supply of college labor
with the college premium and reports the structural estimation results for the elastic-
ities. Section 1.5 provides the calibration and quantitative results. Section 1.6 applies
the calibrated results to study the counter-factual effects of policy measures of limiting
the growth of the higher-education sector.
51.2 Data Sources and Institutional Background
This section provides a brief introduction of the two household survey data sets and a
general description of the college education system in China. My main data sources are
drawn from a longitudinal data set, the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS),4
including 9 survey waves from 1989 to 2011. I use another cross-sectional data set, the
China General Social Survey (CGSS) for further information after 2003. I also present
a brief history of evolution of college education as well as its private financing in China
since the 1980s.
1.2.1 Data Sources
To quantify the effects of college expansion policy on both college enrolment for rural
and urban students and increased human capital within subgroups requires micro-level
data with detailed information about the income, residential status, education and
employment of workers. To satisfy the requirements, two micro-level survey data sets
are used in this chapter, a longitudinal data set CHNS, and a cross-sectional data set
CGSS.
The CHNS data is an unbalanced panel household survey with refreshment that
includes 26,000 individuals in nine5 provinces of China, including Guangxi, Guizhou,
Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shandong, as shown in the
Figure 1.1. The provinces sampled are broadly representative of China’s regional vari-
ation. Of these provinces, two are dynamic high-growth ones in China’s east coastal
region (Jiangsu and Shandong); two are located in the northeast region (Liaoning and
Heilongjiang), with one heavily industrialized (Liaoning); three are located in the mid-
dle region (Henan, Hubei, and Hunan); and two are in the southwest, where a large
fraction of population consists of ethnic minorities (Guangxi and Guizhou). These sur-
veys provide wage, education, employment and demographic information for the survey
4 The CHNS is jointly conducted by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center
for Disease Control and Prevention. More detailed information about the CHNS can be found at the
CPC UNC website: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china
5 The sample in 2011 was expanded by adding Shanghai, Beijing and Chongqing, the three mega
municipalities in China.
6years 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011.
Figure 1.1: Map of Survey Regions
The main advantages of the CHNS relative to other publicly-available data sets
are that it includes data on both rural and urban areas, and its survey waves cover
all the relevant years of the college expansion policy, as well as the recent trends.6
One potential concern is whether the unweighed panel is representative of the whole
China on the key dimensions, including the college enrolment, labor supply and wage
differentials between rural and urban residents. To allay the concern, in Table 1.1 I
compare summary statistics from the nine waves of the CHNS (first panel) to data from
four censuses as reported in the China Statistical Yearbooks (CSYs)7 as in the bottom
panel.
6 Other publicly available data sets like the Chinese Household Income Project survey (CHIP) and
China General Social Survey (CGSS) include only years before or after the college expansion, or only
urban households like the Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey (UHIES).
7 The census occurs every five years, and the relevant series 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010,
available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/CensusData/
7Comparison of the two panels of Table 1.1 shows that the CHNS oversampled high-
school graduates relative to college graduates, and in general oversampled males. There-
fore, in each survey year, we separate the CHNS sample into cells by four education types
and eight age groups, so that in each education-age cell, the proportion is comparable
with the national survey. The share of workers with education levels of primary-school
and below, middle-school graduates, high-school graduates and college/university grad-
uates in the weighted sample remain roughly in line with census data in each of the
5-year age groups.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of CHNS Sample
CHNS Survey Years
1988 1990 1992 1996 1999 2003 2005 2008 2010
Provinces 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 11
Full-time workers 3,670 3,128 2,792 2,790 2,842 3,613 3,806 4,197 5,556
Percentage of
-Male workers 59.62 58.95 60.06 59.17 61.01 56.32 56.57 56.85 56.37
-Urban hukou 69.06 71.14 68.02 64.60 57.30 37.75 37.28 35.62 46.87
-High-school graduates 24.55 26.69 29.48 35.25 37.16 27.48 26.12 23.73 27.27
-College graduates 3.11 4.99 4.19 4.76 7.11 6.64 9.22 8.46 15.59
National Census Survey Years
- 1990 - 1995 2000 - 2005 - 2010
Provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Percentage of
-Male workers - 55.04 - 54.26 54.66 - 54.58 - 55.46
-High-school graduates - 15.12 - 12.01 14.60 - 14.02 - 16.24
-College graduates - 2.92 - 3.23 5.11 - 7.68 - 12.52
The CGSS survey data sets focus on the post-policy change years. It includes only
urban households in 2003 survey, but both urban and rural households are included
in the survey waves afterwards. Around 6,000-10,000 households are included in each
survey year. These surveys contain detailed information on individual education history,
annual income and working experience as well as family background.
From these data sets, I create two samples: (1) a wage sample including weekly
8wages of workers by demographic groups and (2) a working hours count sample that
I use to measure the amount of labor supplied by each group. I divide the sample
into different labor groups, distinguished by sex, education (less than high-school, high-
school diploma, college drop-outs, college/university diploma, and graduate school), and
8 age-groups (21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60). And we construct
a separate sequence of college application and enrolment ratios of rural versus all high-
school graduates in each of the college entrance examination years from the precise
information on individual education history from the CGSS survey data sets.
Both samples include all individuals aged 21-60 who worked at least 20 hours per
week in the preceding year. The wage measure that I use throughout the paper is the
average weekly wage, computed as total annual or monthly labor earnings divided by
total weeks worked. To get the real wage, I adjust the nominal wage using last year’s
CPI (equal to 100 in 1988). I compute total working hours for each demographic group
in each year by calculating the product of total annual hours (weeks worked times usual
weekly hours) and the individual sample weight. Since the CHNS doesn’t have the
corresponding individual weight, I construct the sample weights using the population
census data in the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010.
1.2.2 Institutional Background
China’s Higher Education. China has the largest higher education system in the
world. According to the Ministry of Education,8 there are 2,790 public higher educa-
tion institutions enrolling 29.7 million students, including 1,867 regular higher education
institutions with a total enrolment of 23.9 million, and 348 institutions for adults with a
total enrolment of 5.8 million; and 707 other private institutions with a total enrolment
of 5.3 million. With a centralized educational system, all the higher education institu-
tions are under the control of the Ministry of Education through enrolment planning,
funding, and evaluation.
Since 1977, The National College Entrance Examination (NCEE) is a prerequisite
for entrance into almost all higher education institutions at the undergraduate level, and
the unique criteria for college admission.9 The examination was uniformly designed
8 Most recent publicly available data in 2012 are at http://www.moe.edu.cn.
9 Starting 2003, some top pilot schools were given autonomy of admission quota of no more than
9by the Ministry of Education until the early 2000s.10 Exams are held annually, and
generally taken by high school students at the end of their third year, although there
has been no age restriction since 2001.
The initial college admission rate11 was astonishingly low, at only 4.7% in 1977.
Since the opening up in 1978, China’s economy has been growing at a stellar rate, and
so has its physical capital accumulation. The high gross savings rate, together with the
complementarity between physical capital and high-skill workers, increase the return to
college education.12 Up to the early 1990s, the admission rate to college education
maintained a relatively constant growth of around 8.5% annually.
However, during the Asian financial crisis, in order to alleviate the unemployment,
stimulate domestic consumption and meet the tremendous demand for higher education,
the State Council decided to embark on a radical enrolment expansion plan.13 It only
took 4 months for the policy to be announced and take into effect; within just one year,
the college admission rate was increased by more than 40%, from 33.8% in 1998 to 55.6%
in 1999, as shown in the Figure 1.2. The admission rate has been kept around 60% since
then. The initial target of increasing the gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education to
15% by 2010 was already surpassed in 2005, the actual gross enrolment rate increasing
from less than 10% in 1998 to over 20% in 2005. After 2006, the government began to
control the rapid growth of tertiary education, and the growth of college admission rate
transformed to a steady and moderate trend.
The substantial increase in the college entry class would require a wider base of
support for higher education. However, Between 1992 and 2003, the proportion of
government expenditures in total education expenditures decreased from 84% to 62%.14
As a result, the burden of financing for tertiary education shifted from entirely
government to the point where households have to finance a substantially increasing
5% of their total enrolments.
10 The Ministry of Education allowed the College Enrolment Office of Shanghai and Guangdong to
employ an independent exam in 1985. Starting from 2003, Beijing, Tianjin, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang were
allowed to adopt independent propositions. Now there are 16 provinces and municipalities that have
customized exams.
11 Calculated as the ratio of college admitted population by the population taken the NCEE in the
same year according to the Ministry of Education.
12 [14] and [15]
13 “Thirty years of evolution and development in education”,
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49157/49166/8143089.html.
14 According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2005.
10
Figure 1.2: College Admission Rate
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amount through tuition and fees. Indeed, the expenditure on education ranked the first
in total household expenditure in the 10th 5-year-plan.15
Private Financing and Tuition Fees. Higher education was free of charge and
heavily subsidized by the government until 1989, when the dual-track system of tuition
was set up, wherein students who scored below a cut-off line on the NCEE could attend
colleges at a higher tuition level. The tuition fee was only 200 RMB per student in 1989,
it grew to 610 RMB in 1993 , when the State Council stated that higher education is
non-compulsory, and students should pay tuition in principle.16 The tuition system
was unified in 1997, and tuition and fees vary by institutions, locations and programs.
As shown in the Table 1.2, the average per capita tuition and fees grew at at an annual
rate of 11.8% from 1996 to 2011, peaking at annual growth of around 30% from 1996
to 1999.
15 According to the China Youth and Child Research Center (CYCRC) 2007, Report on the Devel-
opment of the China Youth During the 10th and 11th 5-Year-Plan.
16 According to the Guidelines for China’s Education Reform and Development in 1993.
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Table 1.2: Per Capita Tuition and Fees
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Tuition and Fees 1477 1824 2145 2956 3464 3928 4324 4562
Growth Rate (%) 34.3 23.5 17.6 37.8 17.2 13.4 10.1 5.5
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Tuition and Fees 4857 5071 4931 6489 7017 7182 7510 7850
Growth Rate (%) 6.5 4.4 -2.7 3.2 8.1 2.4 4.6 4.5
Reliance on household wealth to finance students’ tertiary education, the lack of well-
established credit markets, and substantial increases in tuition and fees might restrict the
opportunities for students from poor families to attain a college education. Studies on
China’s household wealth universally report the huge and increasing income and wealth
gap ever since the economic reforms in 1978, between rural and urban households. The
Figure 1.3 displays the tuition burden by household residential status, calculated as
the ratio of average per capita tuition and fees over the annual per capita disposable
household income.17 Tuition and fees have been well over the average per capita
disposable incomes of rural households since 1999, while for urban households, it is
around half of average per capita income. Thus China’s geographic unbalance and
segregation could potentially affect enrolment decisions through financial constraints
faced by different residential groups.
1.3 Baseline Model
In this section, I consider a heterogeneous-agent OLG model. The economy is populated
with a continuum of individuals, each live for finite periods, with age indexed by j =
1, . . . , T . Individuals start with high school graduation (j = 1) , survive from age j to
j + 1 with probability ζj , and die after period T for sure. Time is discrete, at each
period a new cohort of measure one enters the economy. Since cohort size and survival
probabilities are time-invariant, the model age distribution is stationary.
We assume a risk-free asset market for simplicity, consumers could borrow at the
17 Based on the tuition and income statistics from NBS, various years.
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Figure 1.3: College Tuition Burden by Residential Status
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risk-free interest rate up to a borrowing constraint a. Workers in different education
and age groups are imperfect substitutes in production.
1.3.1 Timing
At birth, individuals observe their initial wealth and ability level, and choose to attend
college or not. If they choose to go to college, they will spend the first 4 periods in
college, living on their initial wealth and a very small amount of stipends endowed by
the government. If instead they choose non-college, they work from period 1 and will
earn the high-school wage.
Lifetime is composed of working and retirement periods, T = TW +TR. The working
periods are 1 through TW for high school workers, and 5 through TW for college labor.
In period TW + 1 through T , individuals earn retirement pension that is a function of
their effective working wage.
1.3.2 Consumer’s Problem
Value Function. Instead of working, college students get an annual stipend ycol in
the first 4 periods: j = 1, . . . , 4, after graduation, college workers work in periods
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j = 5, . . . , Tw. High school graduates work through the whole working period.
A worker’s labor income is composed by a wage level on efficient units of work by
the corresponding age and education group, and her efficient units of labor supplied, as
an exponential function of her ability, age and education level. Consider a worker at
age j, ability level b and education e ∈ {H,C}, denoting high school and college educa-
tion respectively. Age efficiency schedule N(j, b, e) is assumed to follow an exponential
function of a second-degree polynomial with coefficients depending on worker’s ability
and education.
V (j, e, b, a) = max
c,a′
{U(c) + βζjV (j + 1, e, b, a′)}
subject to
c+ ζja′ = (1 + r)a+ y
y =
{
wejN(j, b, e)(1− τ) if working
ycol if j=1,. . . , 4 and e=C
a′ ≥ a
Consumers are subject to borrowing constraint a each period, and make their con-
sumption as well as saving choice for next period a′. One unit of savings delivers 1/ζj
units of assets next period, reflecting the annuity-market survivors’ premium.
After retiring at the end of period Tw, individuals earn a retirement pension φ(e, b)
as a function of their effective working wage determined by education and ability levels,
for periods j = Tw + 1, . . . , T = Tw + TR
V (j, e, b, a) = max
c,a′
{U(c) + βζjV (j + 1, e, b, a′)}
c+ ζja′ = (1 + r)a+ φ(e, b)
a′ ≥ a
Education Choice. In the beginning of their life-time, individuals make college en-
rolment decisions with full knowledge of their initial ability and asset endowments. The
government controls the total college admission by choosing the ability threshold B,
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where in equilibrium the desired college admission ECt satisfies:
ECt =
∫∫
Bt
η(b, a)dF (b)dF (a) (1.1)
With both types of workers’ value function defined above, individual’s education choice
is belowing:
V(b, a) =
{
max{V (1, C, b, a), V (1, H, s, a)} if b ≥ Bt
V (1, H, b, a) if b < Bt
(1.2)
η(b, a) =
{
1 if V(b, a) = V (1, C, b, a)
0 if V(b, a) = V (1, H, b, a)
(1.3)
The first order condition can be written as the following equation if a is not binding,
where c is the current period consumption and c′ is consumption in the next period:
u′(c) = β(1 + r)u′(c′) (1.4)
1.3.3 Firm’s Problem
There is a large number of competitive firms, with the following production technology,
where Ht and Ct denote the aggregate high-school and college educated labor.
F (Ht, Ct,Kt) = AK
1−α
t (θctC
ρ
t + θhtH
ρ
t )
α
ρ
Ht =
 Tw∑
j=1
αjH
η
jt
 1η , Ct =
 Tw∑
j=1
βjC
η
jt
 1η
I assume imperfect substitution between different age and education groups, following
the assumption in [2]. −∞ < ρ ≤ 1 is a function of elasticity of substitution σE between
the two education groups, where ρ = 1− 1/σE . Similarly, −∞ < η ≤ 1 is a function of
the partial elasticity of substitution σA between different age groups and same education
level, η = 1− 1/σA. αj , βj and {θct, θht} sequences are the relative effective parameters
between age and education groups. When αj = 1, βj = 1 and η = 1, labor inputs are
perfect substitutable with same education and different age.
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In each period, the representative firm takes both wages and interest rate as given,
and choose its optimal college and high-school labor cj , hj and investment demand i:
Ω(k) = max
cj ,hj ,i
F (H,C, k)−
∑
j
wcjcj −
∑
j
whj hj − i+
1
1 + r
Ω(k′) (1.5)
subject to: k′ = (1− δ)k+ i− 2( ik − δ)2k, δ denotes the steady-state depreciation rate,
and  is the investment cost parameter.
The first order conditions are:
1 + rt
1− ( itkt − δ)
= αAkα−1t+1
(
θct+1C
ρ
t+1 + θht+1H
ρ
t+1
) 1−α
ρ +
1− δ + 2(
i2t+1
k2t+1
− δ2)
1− ( it+1kt+1 − δ)
wCjt = αβjθctAk
1−αCρ−ηt (θctC
ρ
t + θhtH
ρ
t )
α
ρ
−1
Cη−1jt
wHjt = ααjθhtAk
1−αHρ−ηt (θctC
ρ
t + θhtH
ρ
t )
α
ρ
−1
Hη−1jt
In the steady state, the first equation reduces to:
r + δ = αAkα−1 (θctC
ρ
t + θhtH
ρ
t )
1−α
ρ
1.3.4 Equilibrium Definition
A stationary equilibrium in this economy is a set of value functions and decision rules
for the households: {ct(j, e, b, a), at+1(j, e, b, a), ηt(b, a), Vt(j, e, b, a)}, firms’ optimal de-
cision Ct, Ht,Kt, the capital rental rate r, and the wage rate for college and non-college
labor, wCjt, w
H
jt , such that
1. Given the labor income tax τ , and initial endowments, individuals’ decision rules
and value functions solve problems (1.1).
2. Firms’ decisions solve the corresponding problem (1.5).
3. Asset market clears
K =
T∑
j=1
µj
∫
a(j, e, b, a−1)dF (b, s, a−1), (1.6)
4. College labor market for each cohort clears, j = 1, . . . , Tw:
Cj = µj
∫
η(b, a)dF (b, a) (1.7)
16
5. High-school labor market for each cohort clears, j = 1, . . . , Tw:
Hj = µj
∫
(1− η(b, a))dF (b, a) (1.8)
6. The government chooses college entry threshold Bt and the budget constraint
satisfies
∑
e=C,H
T∑
j=Tw+1
µj
∫
f rweTwφ(e, b)dF (b) +
4∑
j=1
µj
∫
Bt
ycoldF (b)
= τµj
Tw∑
j=5
∫
wCjtN(j, b, C)η(b, a)dF (b, a)
+ τµj
Tw∑
j=1
∫
wHjtN(j, b,H)(1− η(b, a))dF (b, a) (1.9)
1.3.5 Model Mechanism
In this section I will discuss the general equilibrium effects of an expansion in the
college entry class. In the initial steady state, individual college enrolment decision
depends on the comparison of life-time value out of college and high school education.
As shown in Figure 1.4, individuals with little initial assets would prefer to go to work
early to consume more early on, and wealthy agents would prefer to go to college
and earn a positive college wage premium in their life-time. There is also a positive
correlation between individual ability level and the probability to go to college, since
smarter workers could generally reap more benefits from the college education, as shown
by Figure 1.5.
We could further graph the education choice outcome of an individual characterized
by both ability and initial wealth level as in Figure 1.6. The college admission was
determined by both individual preferences and the college entrance ability threshold
set by the government. As college expands by a substantial magnitude, the increased
college labor supply will drive down the college wage premium where less workers would
choose to enrol. Thus, for the same amount of assets, individuals need to be endowed
with more ability to be willing to go to college, and for the same level of ability, they
should be wealthier to attend. The indifference curve of college education choice is
driven to the right in the mid-panel of Figure 1.6.
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Figure 1.4: Value Functions over Initial Asset Levels for College and High School Edu-
cation
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1.4 Empirical Analysis
This section presents (1) the time series of college wage premiums and the effective
college over high-school labor supplies, for different age and residential status groups,
(2) strong negative correlations between the change in college wage premiums and the
labor supply in the periods immediately after the college expansion in 1999, and (3) a
second-stage estimation of elasticities of substitution between age and education groups.
1.4.1 College Wage Premiums
College Wage Premiums by Age Groups. Table 1.3 presents the estimated college
wage premiums for five-year age groups, taken at each survey year in CHNS from 1993
onwards. The college wage premiums are estimated in separate regression models for
each age group in each survey year, using samples of full-time workers with exactly a
high school or exactly a college degree. Each regression includes a dummy for college
graduates, a linear age term, and dummies for other demographic properties, gender
and residential status.
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An important feature of the college wage premium in Table 1.3 is that they are based
on differences in earnings between individuals of the same age with a college degree or
a high school diploma. This measure compares individuals who attended elementary
and secondary schooling together, and faced the identical scenarios when they made
decisions to attend college or not. Depending on our interest in explaining the effects
of college expansion policy on college entrance choices and the systematic age effects
in our econometric models, this measure will outweigh the potential disadvantage of
ignoring different labor market experience in the same age groups who have different
level of schooling.
Table 1.3: College-High School Wage Differentials by Age and Year
Age Range
21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60
1992 -0.149 -0.347 -0.004 -0.108 0.149 -0.244 0.674 0.045
(0.054) (0.028) (0.028) (0.016) (0.016) (0.040) (0.039) (0.018)
1996 -0.096 -0.059 0.186 0.089 0.281 0.292 -0.096 0.195
(0.023) (0.011) (0.027) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.051)
1999 0.158 0.096 -0.066 0.110 0.146 0.138 0.089 0.361
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.032) (0.014)
2003 0.215 0.172 0.309 0.156 0.250 0.388 0.194 0.315
(0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.048)
2005 0.197 0.295 0.315 0.224 0.493 0.489 0.359 0.324
(0.027) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.021) (0.026)
2008 0.075 0.208 0.263 0.161 0.240 0.531 0.570 0.441
(0.024) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.026)
2010 0.047 0.272 0.267 0.296 0.411 0.383 0.395 0.487
(0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010)
The entries in Table 1.3 provide a variety of information on the evolution of college-
high school wage differentials Comparisons across the rows of Table 1.3 reveal the age
profile of the college-high school wage differentials in the particular survey year. Across
the years, the age profiles generally show a hump-shape with the maximum obtained
around age 41-50. And comparing down a column of the table shows the changing
college premium for a particular age group.
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Panel A of Figure 1.7 graphs the time series of college wage premium across three
representative age groups. Among the youngest group, 21-25 years olds, the college wage
premium increases until 2003, when the first cohort of college students who is impacted
by the college expansion policy in 1999 graduates, and immediately decreases from that
year onwards. For older groups, their college wage premium generally rose until later
than 2008 then slowly levelled off. The college wage premium trends across different
age groups in Figure 1.7 show that the college wage premiums for specific age groups
can rise or fall independently of other groups, suggesting the potential importance of
the age effects on the college wage premium.
College Wage Premium by Household Registration Status. Using the detailed
household registration information from CHNS,18 Table 1.4 documents the college
premium by individual’s household residential status across survey years. Rural workers
have lower college wage premiums until 1996, it grew sharply and overtook the college
wage premium of the corresponding urban workers from 1996 to 1999 when tuition fees
increased. After 2003, the college wage premium generally levelled off. While for urban
workers, the college wage premiums stay below the corresponding rural premiums since
1999, and it began to decrease after 2005, as shown in the panel A of Figure 1.8.
Table 1.4: College-High School Wage Differentials by Residential Status
Survey Years
1988 1990 1992 1996 1999 2003 2005 2008 2010
Rural 0.092 0.049 -0.229 0.054 0.189 0.554 0.503 0.523 0.478
(0.006) (0.004) (0.017) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Urban 0.038 0.022 0.105 0.100 0.165 0.247 0.377 0.315 0.354
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
18 When individuals surveyed multiple times throughout the survey series, the earliest available
household registration status information is taken.
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1.4.2 Relative Supply
We turn next to an overview of the relative supplies of college-educated labor by age and
residential status. Following [1], I measure efficient supply of labor by each demographic
group as weighted total hours worked in that group, where the weighting being the
average relative wage across all the survey years. I then take the log ratio of the effective
college over high school hours as the relative supply of college versus high-school labor.
Panel B of Figure 1.7 shows the evolution of the relative college labor in three
representative age groups: 21-25 years olds, 26-30 years olds and 46-50 years olds. For
the 21-24 years-old group, relative college labor supplies grow most sharply from 1999
to 2003, while for older groups, the relative supplies trended upwards fairly steadily
after 1999.
The relative college labor supply by household registration status is shown in Figure
1.8. The general college labor supply is higher across the years for urban hukou-holders.
To compare the growth rate of relative college labor supply, I use the y-axis on the
left to show the relative college labor supply for rural workers, the corresponding urban
labor supply is presented using the y-axis on the right. The relative college labor supply
grows at around the same rate for both residential groups from 1996 to 2003, when the
college tuition grows fast. After 2003, the rural college labor grows strictly faster.
Using the detailed individual education history from CGSS surveys, we construct
the rural student’s ratio over all the college applicants (those who took college entrance
examination in their senior years of high school) , and the rural students’ proportion
over all the actual college enrolment population, by the years when they took the Na-
tional College Entrance Exams, as in Figure 1.9. For both the application and enrolment
trends, the relative ratio of rural students didn’t grow until after 1999, this confirms
the change of relative college labor supply among different residential groups. And one
possible reason might be that rural residents are restricted by their available family re-
sources to finance the substantial increase in college tuition and fees. From 1997 to 1999,
the rural students’ college enrolment ratio dropped even more than their corresponding
application ratio.
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1.4.3 Elasticity Estimation
Figure 1.10 graphs the times series of college wage premium and the corresponding rel-
ative labor supply. The overall series for the college labor supply is upward sloping, the
supply grows faster than average after 1996, especially after 2003 when the first cohort
of college labor graduates out of the college expansion in 1999. In the meantime, the
college wage premium began to fall after 2005, it appears that fluctuations in supply
growth has the potential to explain observed college wage premium changes, especially
after 2005. To further examine the negative correlation between the college wage premi-
ums and the relative college labor supplies, we present the changes in these two variables
from 2003 to 2008, in 64 distinct age, gender and education groups in Figure 1.11.
Thus, using the first order conditions from the firm’s problem, as in [2], and applying
a linear time trend to proxy the technology shock (log(θct/θht)) and the aggregate supply
effect (( 1σE − 1σA ) log(
Ct
Ht
)), we get the first stage estimates (REG1) for the elasticity for
age-group specific college labor supply. The estimated year effect, as shown in the first
column of Table 1.5 is positive and significant.
log
(
wCjt
wHjt
)
= log
(
βj
αj
)
+ log
(
θct
θht
)
−
(
1
σE
− 1
σA
)
log
(
Ct
Ht
)
− 1
σA
log
(
Cjt
Hjt
)
+ ejt
REG1 : log
(
wCjt
wHjt
)
= bj + dt− 1
σA
log
(
Cjt
Hjt
)
+ ejt
The second and third column of Table 1.5 presents the estimates of the second-stage
models that include both age-group specific relative college labor supplies and the ag-
gregate labor supply. Where the relative productivity efficiency effect (log(βj/αj)) is
estimated on the first stage age-group elasticity, and the aggregate supplies of college
and high school labor time series is constructed assuming perfect (as in REG2) and
imperfect (as in REG3) substitution across age groups with same education. The es-
timated elasticity of substitution between college and high school labor is in the range
of 1.1 to 1.9, comparable to the estimates in [1] and [2].19 And my estimation of
elasticity of substitution between different age groups are in the range of 4.4 to 7.6,
generally higher than the estimates range of 4 to 6 from [2]. The estimates of age-group
19 I compare my estimation results with the elasticity estimates from United States of [1] and [2] in
Table 1.6.
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Table 1.5: Estimated Models for the College-High School Wage Gap
REG1 REG2 REG3
Age-group specific -0.138* -0.134* -0.130*
relative supply (0.054) (0.060) (0.060)
Time Trend 0.024*** 0.027** 0.026***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005)
Katz-Murphy aggr. -0.193
supply index (0.158)
Aggr. supply index -0.173*
with imperfect substitution (0.069)
R2 0.745 0.746 0.748
pvalue 0.001 0.001 0.001
Table 1.6: Elasticity Estimates Comparison
Elasticities China(CHNS,CGSS) U.S.(Katz& Murphy) U.S.(Card& Lemieux)
Age-group (σA) 4.4-7.6 4-6
Col-High (σE) 1.1-1.9 1.4 1.1-1.6
elasticities from the second-stage are close to the first-stage results, and the year effects
across different specification show a steeply rising returns.
1.5 Calibration
Given the elasticities estimation in Section 1.4, I calibrate the parameters by choosing
an initial steady state which is consistent with the pre-expansion policy data. Assuming
that after the college expansion, only the ability threshold for college entry changes, I
present the implications of the calibrated model for college wage premiums and rela-
tive college labor supply for different subgroups, both in comparative statics and the
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simulated transition path.
1.5.1 Parameter Choices
Exogenously Determined Parameters A model period corresponds to one year of
calendar time. Individuals enter the economy at age 21 and retire at age 55 (working
periods Tw = 35). Retirement lasts for 15 years, and everyone dies at age 70. The net
interest rate, r, is set equal to 2%. Since there is no leisure decision involved, I use the
conventional power utility specification of preferences, and the risk aversion for utility
function is set equal to 2.0. The labor share of the Cobb-Douglas production technology
is set at 0.50, broadly consistent with the existing empirical evidence.20 Table 1.7
shows all the exogenously determined parameters.
Table 1.7: Exogenously Determined Parameters of the Baseline Economy
Description Parameter Value Remark
Risk aversion σ 2.0
Interest rate r 0.02
Discount rate β 1/(1 + r)
Labor Share α 0.5
Survival Rate from j to j + 1 ζj — WHO(2000)
Els of substitution btw age groups σA 7.60 Estimation from data
Els of substitution btw edu groups σE 1.40 Estimation from data
Working periods Tw 35 years: 21-55
Retirement periods Tr 15 years: 56-70
Distributions: Ability, Initial Wealth for Rural and Urban Groups Agents
enter the economy with perfect knowledge of two individual-specific attributes: abil-
ity and initial assets endowment. Accounting for the sizeable gap between the rural
and urban household, not only in income and wealth level, but also in the education
20 As in [16] and [17].
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resources,21 , I assume different distribution parameters for rural and urban groups.
The initial asset is assumed to follow log-normal distributions for both groups, and
the ability is assumed to be uniformly distributed. Thus the distribution of ability and
initial assets yield six parameters to be calibrated: (i) the standard deviation of ability
for both groups, (ii) the mean ability level for the rural group, and (iii) the mean and
standard deviation of initial wealth level for both groups (the average rural ability and
rural wealth level are simply set to a computationally convenient level).
Data Targets I use the wage series from micro-econometric evidence of the panel data
to pin down the ability distributions for both age groups. For initial wealth distribution
for rural and urban individuals, I use the target of aggregate household disposable
income as well as the corresponding Gini coefficients.22 The detailed list of steady
state targets are listed in Table 1.8.
Table 1.8: Steady-State Targets and Associated Parameters
Parameter Value Target Data
Threshold (Initial) A1 0.60 College admission rate before the expansion 0.33
Threshold (After Expansion) A2 0.35 College admission rate after the expansion 0.56
SD of ability (Rural) σRb 0.29 SD of log wage for rural workers 1.09
Average Ability (Rural) E[b]R 0.5 Mean log wage for rural workers 5.13
SD of ability (Urban) σUb 0.29 SD of log wage for urban workers 0.95
Average Ability (Urban) E[b]U 0.65 Mean log wage for urban workers 5.23
SD of initial asset distr. (Rural) σRa 0.7 Rural Gini-Coefficient 0.35
Mean of initial asset distr. (Rural) E[a]R 1.0 Rural Household Disposable Income 2210
SD of initial asset distr. (Urban) σUa 2.0 Urban Gini-Coefficient 0.25
Mean of initial asset distr. (Urban) E[a]U 2.65 Urban Household Disposable Income 5854
Age Efficiency Schedule and the Pension Scheme. To make sure labor income
sequences generated by the model be consistent with the empirical evidence on the
dynamics of wages found in the panel data, we need to select the functional forms for
the age efficiency schedules and the retired pension scheme. Specifically, I assume the
21 As documented by [18] and [19] there are huge gaps in educational funding, teacher qualifications,
and school conditions between rural and urban schools.
22 Income statistics from NBS, various years.
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age efficiency follows an exponential function of a quadratic polynomial on individual
age f(j), and an individual component that follows a linear function of age, with the
coefficient determined by individual ability and intercept by education level.23
N(j, b, e) = exp
[
f(j) + bj + g(e)
]
We model the pension system in China as a defined benefits plan, as in [20], the
replacement ratio is assumed to be 60%. And this is also general in line with the
retirement labor income in the survey data, so we approximate the pension scheme to
be 60% of the average life-time labor income. The subsidy for college education ycol is
assumed to be 30% of the current average wage, which closely assembles the average
living expenses for a college students.
1.5.2 Quantitative Results
In this section, I begin by presenting the comparison of two steady states, before and
after the college expansion policies. I then proceed to give out the simulation results on
the transitional path of the key variables of interest.
The Long-term Impacts of a College Expansion: Steady State Comparison.
As shown in Table 1.9, as the ability threshold is lowered by the government, college
wage premiums are decreased for both groups by similar magnitudes, where the college
labor supply increased much more in rural than urban groups. This is also shown by a
35% increase in the admission rate for rural students, where only less than 20% increase
for the corresponding urban groups in the long run.24 It seems in the long run,
the ability effects dominate. Rural students are concentrated around the a relatively
lower level of ability, with less initial wealth. As the ability threshold decreases, more
rural students could access the college education with an ability level below the initial
threshold and above the later one. On the other hand, urban students’ ability are
generally higher, so they are not affected as much by the expansion.
23 As in [7], the regression residual of a raw wage on a polynomial in age is assumed to follow a
linear trend in age, with coefficients and intercepts determined by a pair of perfectly correlated learning
abilities.
24 This is in line with our estimation of rural college enrolment ratio using CGSS data in Figure 1.9
and as documented by [18].
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Table 1.9: Steady State Comparison
Average College Log Relative College Admission
Wage Premium Labor Supply Rate
Baseline(Rural, Before) 1.09 -1.19 0.21
Baseline(Urban, Before) 1.10 0.14 0.50
Baseline(Rural, After) 0.28 -0.33 0.47
Baseline(Urban, After) 0.29 0.65 0.70
Transitional Dynamics. Figure 1.12 displays the transition path of the college en-
rolment rates for urban and rural students in Panel A. There is a clear overshooting
trend that the initial admission rates increase by over 40%, then gradually decrease
over time as more college labor supplied and college wage premium driven down. Panel
B shows the relative college labor supplied, it doesn’t increase much in the first four
periods before the first cohorts of students affected by the expansion policy graduates,
then it also overshoots to a higher level than the new steady state college labor supply,
and gradually decreases afterwards. Rural college labor increases much more than the
corresponding urban labor. Panel C presents the percentage decrease in college wage
premium, the premium decreases most in the first four years after the expansion, and
increases gradually after that. The general patten of transitional dynamics are in line
with our empirical trends in Section 1.4.
1.6 Counterfactual Experiments
In Nov 1998, the chief economist Dr. Min Tang, at the Beijing representative office of
the Asian development bank, wrote a proposal to the Premier Minister Rongji Zhu on
expanding the college admission by one fold in three years.25 The initial proposal was
to increase the college entry class by 25% annually until it expand the college admission
population by one fold in three to four years. The suggestion was quickly taken into
consideration by the Ministry of Education, and the initial target in early 1999 was set
25 Published in the Economic News on Feb. 19th, 1999 under title of “Education to Promote
Consumption”, http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/20041023/15201102716.shtml.
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to increase the college entry class by 21% from the previous year. However, in June of
1999, the official policy by the State Council increased the college admission quota by
47.4%,26 which largely exceeded the initial expansion plan.
In this section, I conduct counterfactual analysis using the calibrated model in Sec-
tion 1.5. The policy experiment is on an alternative conservative expansion policy,
closely resembles the initial proposal by Dr. Min Tang, and the plan of the Ministry of
Education in the early 1999. Comparisons are made between the actual policy expan-
sion and the alternative policy experiments with welfare analysis on different residential
groups.
Mild College Expansion Policy In view of the recent decreasing in the college wage
premium, and especially in the young college graduates, as shown in Figure 1.7, there
are heated debate on the possible oversupply of college graduates in China. In the first
counterfactual experiment, I examine the alternative effects on enrolment decisions and
the corresponding relative college labor supply and college wage premiums, for different
residential groups. I increase the college entry class by 20% each year for 3 consecutive
years, which will generate an increase of total enrolment population by only one fold, and
I keep the admission rate constant after the expansion. Comparing to the actual college
expansion starting from 1999 in China, which increase the total enrolment population
by five folds in just 6 years, the policy experiment is a conservative and mild expansion
policy.
Panel A of Table 1.10 presents the college enrolment results, with just a mild expan-
sion, the overall admission rate is increased by only 30%, and although rural enrolment
rate grows faster than the urban groups, the overall relative college labor supply in-
creases by only 57 log points, comparing to an increase of 86 log point in the college
expansion in 1999. As for the urban groups, the relative college labor supply increases
by 9 log points less than the expansion in 1999. Thus a mild college expansion would
generate less college labor supply, especially for the rural groups. A long-term welfare
comparison from the Panel C shows that the overall welfare will increase by less than
the actual college expansion, and this is specially phenomenal for the rural group, with
26 According to “What’s the decision process for the College Expansion?” at
http://learning.sohu.com/20140619/n401049674.shtml.
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a slightly increase of 6.87% comparing to an original 22.70% of increase in their wel-
fare. Since the overall growth in college labor supply in urban groups is less than rural
students, a mild college expansion will increase their welfare by curbing the decrease of
the college wage premium.
Table 1.10: Experiment I: Mild College Expansion
Panel A: Admission Rates
All Urban Rural
Before Expansion 0.33 0.50 0.21
Base Expansion 0.56 0.70 0.47
Mild Expansion 0.43 0.61 0.32
Panel B: Relative College Labor Supply
Change (log points) All Urban Rural
Base Expansion 66 51 86
Mild Expansion 46 45 57
Panel C:Long-term Welfare Comparison
Change (%) All Urban Rural
Base Expansion 19.10 12.08 22.70
Mild Expansion 11.46 13.81 6.87
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I developed an empirically grounded dynamic overlapping-generation
general equilibrium model with endogenous college education choice. It provides a better
understanding of the college labor market by jointly considering an exogenous policy
threshold and an endogenous ability selection conditional on the initial wealth. I allow
for heterogeneity in ability and initial wealth, and produce a model that is consistent
with the main features of life-cycle wage growth and the discrepancies between rural
and urban workers that are the central features of the recent China labor market.
My empirical analyses suggest that there is significant heterogeneity in workers’
response to the substantial college expansion in 1999. The urban students respond
immediately to the college expansion with an overall higher initial asset level. However,
as the college wage premium driven down by the increasing supply of young college
graduates, intention for college enrolment decreased. On the other hand, rural students
are constrained by their average low level of household income, the college labor supply
increased gradually, and the overall growth in rural college labor exceeds the urban
college labor supply. Also, the college-high school wage gaps of different age groups
have not moved together. In particular, the college premium for young graduates fall
immediately after the first cohort affected by the college expansion policy graduated in
2003, while the premium for older workers didn’t level off until five to ten years later.
Following a model that incorporates imperfect substitution between different age
and education groups, I found that the evolution of the college wage premiums accounts
well for the patterns in data. The dramatic exogenous policy change in 1999 serves as a
sharp identification strategy, to estimate the production demand elasticities on different
categories of labor input. As a result, the estimated elasticities are generally comparable
with the previous literature, with a slightly higher elasticities for different age groups.
Finally, I apply the calibrated model to a set of alternative government policies
on college admission. This lays the foundation for the welfare analysis on different
residential subgroups and generations. And the huge college expansion policy, as well
as its effects on different subgroups, constitutes a good case study on acceleration in
the supply of college educated workers across the developing countries.27
27 [21] documented the age-profile of college wage premiums in India, Philippines and Thailand, and
[22] docoumented the case in Vietnam.
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Figure 1.5: Value Functions over Ability Levels
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Figure 1.6: College Enrolment with Ability Thresholds
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Figure 1.7: College Wage Premium and Relative Efficient College Labor Supply by Age
Groups
1990 1992 1996 1999 2003 2005 2008 2010−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
ol
le
ge
 W
ag
e 
Pr
em
iu
m
s
 
 
Age 21−25
Age 26−30
Age 46−50
Panel A: Estimated Collge Wage Premium
1990 1992 1996 1999 2003 2005 2008 2010−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Lo
g 
R
el
at
iv
e 
C
ol
le
ge
 L
ab
or
 S
up
pl
y
 
 
Age 21−25
Age 26−30
Age 46−50
Panel B: Efficient College over High School Labor Supply
33
Figure 1.8: College Wage Premium and Relative Efficient College Labor by Residential
Status
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Panel A: Estimated Collge Wage Premium: Rural Urban
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Figure 1.9: Rural Students’ Share for College Enrolment and Application
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Figure 1.10: College Wage Premium and Relative College Labor Supply
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Figure 1.11: Price and Quantity Changes for 64 Groups, 2003-2008
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Figure 1.12: Transition Path by residential groups
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Chapter 2
Learning Your Earning over
Business Cycles: Excess
Consumption Volatility in
Emerging Countries
2.1 Introduction
This paper emphasizes the individual learning about the heterogeneous income pro-
files (HIP)in explaining salient features of emerging market economies (EMEs) business
cycles-large swings in consumption relative to output and countercyclical current ac-
count dynamics. To do so, we build a general equilibrium business cycle model with
heterogeneous income profiles (HIP) and imperfect information. Agents observe the
history of their own labor income and of a noisy public signal on aggregate total factor
productivity (TFP) shock. They know the distributions of each components of their la-
bor income process, but are faced with imperfect information that they cannot separate
the aggregate and the idiosyncratic shocks. Using the available information, they form
their own expectations about the aggregate TFP, the idiosyncratic shocks, and their
own income growth rate in an optimal (Bayesian) fashion.
37
38
In our model, individual hourly wage income is composed of aggregate and idiosyn-
cratic stochastic components, as well as an individual-specific income growth rate, which
is multiplied by age. Agents observe their income to learn the growth rate of their indi-
vidual human capital and the growth rate of the aggregate economy. Due to information
frictions, a shock to the growth rate of the aggregate economy will be partly attributed
to the growth rate of agents’ own human capital, the latter of which has more persis-
tent effects on agents’ life-time income. As a result, the economy with more information
friction will feature more volatile consumption dynamics relative to output.
To reconcile the key differences between emerging and developed economy business
cycles, we introduce a noisy public signal on aggregate TFP. This allows us to vary the
degree of information imperfection while keeping all the other structural parameters
unchanged. Feeding in the parameters from [23] and calibrating to some key features
on real interest rate and aggregate TFP, the imperfect information model can generate a
higher variability of consumption relative to output. Starting from this baseline imper-
fect information model and reducing the noisiness (variance) of the signal, the model
moments resemble more the developed economies (DCs) regarding variability of con-
sumption and cyclical behaviour. This experiment shows that the degree of uncertainty
that agents face while formulating expectations can potentially explain key differences
of EME business cycles compared to DCs.
Why are information frictions important in accounting for EMEs’ business cycles?
Individuals in EMEs are likely to face more uncertainty because of lack of transparency,
weaker quality of economic statistics, and greater policy uncertainty compared to DCs.
These information frictions would make it harder for individuals in EMEs to predict the
aggregate performance of the economy, which makes it difficult to differentiate a lower
individual income profile from an aggregate TFP shock.
To compare the severity of information frictions in EMEs with DCs, we compare and
analyze the behaviour of GDP growth forecasting in these regions. We first examine
the forecasting errors for EMEs and DCs, and we find that the root mean squared error
(RMSE) of the forecast errors in EMEs is three times that of the DCs, even after con-
trolling for variability of GDP growth, we observe substantially higher unpredictability
in EMEs. We also find a systematically non-zero means of errors in EMEs comparing to
DCs, and the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts for GDP growth is more than three times
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as much for EMEs compared to DCs. This motivates us to study efficiency of individual
forecasts. As documented by [24], the magnitude of information rigidity for EMEs is
twice as high as in advanced economies. And the distribution of the forecast revisions
are more dispersed in EMEs compared to advanced economies, which implies that indi-
vidual beliefs on GDP growth among EMEs are more at odds to each other comparing to
advanced economies. These suggestive findings motivate us to build a structural model
where agents have difficulty differentiating the growth rate of the aggregate economy
from the growth rate of their own income profiles.
Related Literature. Our paper connects two strands of literature-the emerging mar-
ket business cycles literature and the heterogeneous income profiles (HIP) literature. In
the emerging market business cycles literature, [25] and [26], among others, provide
the early contributions. More recently, [27] and [28] study the role of countercyclical
interest rate shocks in EMEs that are amplified through the working capital constraints.
[29] examines the role of trend growth shocks and argue that these shocks can explain
the high variability of consumption relative to output and the countercyclical current
account. [30] argues that imperfect information on trend versus cycle shocks generates
a more realistic response of labor with highly persistent trend growth shocks. These
papers, however, are largely silent about the underlying individual income structure
and our paper complements these studies by explicitly modeling a friction that previous
literature has largely been overlooked.
In the heterogeneous income profiles literature, [31] among others first introduce
an individual-specific life cycle earning process. [32] and [33] reassess the evidence on
labor income dynamics, and develops a hybrid model, where there is an individual
specific age profile and stochastic shocks to income. We introduce this framework in the
standard small open economy (SOE) business cycle models, and extend it to include
heterogeneous income profiles and imperfect information. Our model also contributes to
the news shock literature, [34] and [35] among others, shows the standard RBC model
with Cobb-Douglas preferences failed to deliver empirically-plausible labor dynamics.
Our paper introduces another channel of gradual learning with heterogeneous income
profiles that potentially leads to realistic dynamics of labor supply.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents our empirical
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evidence on information frictions. Section 2.3 introduces the model as well as the infor-
mation structures and the consequent learning process. Section 2.4 presents a simple
linear-quadratic version of the full model that permits an analytical solution, thereby
allowing us theoretically analyse the model mechanism, we also shows a numerical exam-
ple in this section. Section 2.5 concludes and discusses extensions for further research.
2.2 Empirical Evidence: Forecast Error and Revision
To analyse whether there are substantial differences in the uncertainty faced by individ-
uals in EMEs compared with DCs, we compare the forecasting of real GDP growth for
countries belong to each group. We start by calculating the forecast errors, after which
we examine the RMSE of the forecast errors and compare the forecast error’s autocor-
relation structure. Then we test the efficiency of the forecasts by studying the forecast
revisions from individual and consensus forecast data, and compare the evidence from
EMEs and DCs.
Forecast Error. Let the forecast for period t+ 1 GDP growth based on information
available at period t be defined as yˆt+1,t, and actual GDP growth for period t + 1 be
yt+1, the the one-step-ahead forecast error is defined as:
et+1,t = yt+1 − yˆt+1,t (2.1)
Using the data from Consensus Forecasts, IMF’s World Economic Outlook forecasts,1
we summarize the RMSE of Consensus Forecasts’ forecast errors (et+1,t) for a set of
developed and emerging market countries from 1998 to 2007 in Table 2.3.
As suggested in Table 2.3, if we compare across countries, the RMSE of forecast
errors on GDP growth are systematically higher in EMEs than in DCs. This is also
shown by average and median of the RMSE of forecast errors, the average RMSE for
DCs is 0.27 percentage points, less than one third of that corresponding measure of the
EMEs of 0.95 percentage points. The EMEs median value is 0.82 percentage points,
comparing to only 0.30 percentage points for DCs. A systematically higher RMSE
on forecast errors shows that forecasts on future GDP growth are subject to more
1 The GDP growth data are from Bloomberg and refer to quarterly year-on-year growth rates. We
include only the countries with at least 12 quarters of forecasts available.
41
uncertainty and information friction in EMEs. [30] and [36] documented similar results
using the IMF’s World Economic Outlook forecasts. [24] uses survey data obtained
from Consensus Economics, and reported RMSEs for EMEs are on average, more than
twice as the corresponding figures for advanced economies, and still 75% higher even
one month before the target year.
In the third column of Table 2.3, we document the first order autocorrelations of
forecast erros across countries. There is no significant autocorrelation across developed
countries. While in EMEs, both Argentina and Mexico shows a positive and significant
autocorrelation. This type of errors could occur if a trend shock hits the economy and
individuals are uncertain about it. In the case of a positive (negative) aggregate shock,
agents might overestimate (underestimate) the individual income growth rate, which
transfers to the expected life-time income and affects the excess consumption volatility.
As in [30], we document the median of the standard deviations (SDs) of the forecasts
across analysts over the sample periods for each country, and similarly, we get a sys-
tematically higher dispersion across EMEs, which shows that there exists more policy
and information uncertainty and less transparency in EMEs compared to DCs.
To control for the effect that the GDP growth is more volatile in EMEs than DCs,
we apply the measure of Theil’s U as in [37] to compare the relative predictability of
forecasts with different variability. The statistic of Theil’s U for country i with period
t is defined as:
Ui =
√√√√√√√√
1
N
N∑
t=1
e2i,t
1
N
N∑
t=1
y2i,t
(2.2)
When the statistics equals to 0, it means perfect forecast, and larger values means
less forecasting accuracy. We document the statistics as in the last column of Table 2.3.
After controlling for the variability of GDP growth, the forecast errors are still larger for
EMEs, with an average of 0.41, than for DCs, with an average of 0.29. More prominently,
we graph the Theil’s U statistics over log values of GDP per capita across countries. In
Figure 2.1, there is significantly negative correlation between both variables. Generally,
the forecasts are less accurate in less developed countries.
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Figure 2.1: Relative Predictability of Real GDP Growth
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Forecast Revision. Let the forecast for GDP growth at period T based on informa-
tion available at period t (t < T ) be yˆT,t, the forecast revision from period t − 1 to
period t is defined as:
rT,t = yˆT,t − yˆT,t−1 (2.3)
[38] proposed a test of regressing the contemporaneous revision on the lagged forecast
revisions:
rT,t = β + λrT,t−1 + uT,t (2.4)
If λ = 0, forecasts are (weakly) efficient, otherwise, forecast revisions are correlated, and
the null hypothesis of forecast efficiency is rejected. Using the individual and consensus
forecasts on annul GDP growth from a cross-country survey data compiled by Consensus
43
Economics,2 [24] examines the forecast efficiency for 36 EMEs and advanced economies
from 1989 to 2011 at a quarterly frequency. Their regression analysis shows strong
evidence of forecast smoothing (information rigidities). More interestingly, they find
substantial differences in the magnitude of information rigidities in forecasts for EMEs
and advanced economies. The coefficients on lagged revisions for EMEs is significantly
higher at 0.23, comparing to 0.12 for advanced economies. And the distribution of the
forecast revisions are more dispersed in EMEs compared to advanced economies, which
implies that individual beliefs on the GDP growth among EMEs are more at odds to
each other compared to advanced economies.
The evidence we documented above that agents in EMEs are subject to a greater
amount of uncertainty possibly comes from the lack of transparency, weaker quality of
economic statistics, and greater policy uncertainty compared to DCs. These differences
could also transfer to the uncertainty as to how individuals might react to an aggregate
shock. A shock to the growth rate of the aggregate economy will be partly attributed
to the growth rate of agents’ own human capital, and the latter of which has more
persistent effects on agents’ life-time income.
2.3 Baseline Model
Motivated by the above observations, we consider a heterogeneous-agent OLG model
as in chapter 1. The economy is populated with a continuum of individuals, each live
for finite periods, with age indexed by j = 1, . . . , T . Individuals survive from age j to
j + 1 with probability ζj , and die after period T for sure. Time is discrete, at each
period a new cohort of measure one enters the economy. Since cohort size and survival
probabilities are time-invariant, the model age distribution is stationary.
Individuals have heterogeneous income profiles and are subject to imperfect informa-
tion so that they cannot separate the aggregate from the idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore,
they solve the extraction problem and learn the aggregate TFP and their own income
profiles in an optimal (Bayesian) fashion.
2 The data set contains a macroeconomic forecasts made by both public and private economic
institutions in a large number of countries covering the G-7 industrialised nations, Asia Pacific, Eastern
Europe and Latin America. The survey has been conducted monthly since October 1989. For each
target year, the data set contains a sequence of 24 forecasts of each institution made between January
of the year before the target year and December of the target year.
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The baseline model features linear production technology with endogenous labor.
Financial markets are incomplete: agents could borrow or lend in international capital
markets with only one asset being the one-period non-contingent bond, subject to a
borrowing constraint a. The interest rate on the bonds is set internationally and as-
sumed to be constant and equal to r. Every period, agents observe both their own labor
income and a noisy public signal on the aggregate TFP, and update their knowledge on
their own income growth rate and TFP shocks, makes decisions on consumption, saving
and labor supply.
2.3.1 Consumer’s Problem
Individuals start working at birth from age j = 1 to T . An individual’s labor income
depends on her hourly wage wit,j and total working hours n
i
t,j . Following [7], we assume
that the hourly wage for an individual i of age j at time t is:
ln(wit,j) ≡ Iit,j = ln(At) + βij + f(j) + zit + it︸ ︷︷ ︸
eit,j
(2.5)
whereAt is the aggregate TFP, and ln(At) follows an AR(1) process. e
i
t,j is the individual
efficiency units, which is determined by individual age and the history of idiosyncratic
labor productivity shocks. f(j) is a polynomial of individual age, and zit is the persistent
idiosyncratic shock that follows an AR(1) process
zit = ρzz
i
t−1 + η
i
t
with |ρz| < 1, and ηit is i.i.d. draws from a normal distribution, ηit ∼ N(0, σ2η). it is the
iid transitory idiosyncratic shock, it ∼ N(0, σ2 ).
Individuals also observe a noisy public signal on aggregate TFP as
xt = ln(At) + θt
where θt ∼ N(0, σ2θ), when σθ → ∞ is identical to no signal for aggregate TFP, and
σθ = 0 represents perfect information on aggregate TFP. Agents observe both their
hourly wage Iit,j and the public signal on aggregate TFP xt to infer the true At and
their own type βi using the Kalman filter.
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The Kalman Filtering Problem In order to express the learning process as a
Kalman filtering problem, we use the state-space representation as in [39]. This form is
composed of a state equation and an observation equation. The state equation describes
the evolution of the vector of state variables that is unobserved:
βi
zit+1
ln(At+1)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sit+1,j+1
=

1 0 0
0 ρz 0
0 0 ρA

︸ ︷︷ ︸
F

βi
zit
ln(At)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sit,j
+

0
ηit
νt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξit+1
(2.6)
The observation equation describes observed variables as a linear function of the
underlying hidden state and a transitory shock. 3
[
Iit,j
xt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
yit,j
=
[
j 1 1
0 0 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
H′

βi
zit
ln(At)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sit,j
+
[
it
θt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
εit
(2.7)
We assume that both shocks ξit+1 and ε
i
t have i.i.d. normal distributions and are
independent of each other, with Q and R denoting their covariance matrix respectively.
Let the prior belief over Sit,j be a multivariate normal distribution, with one-period-
ahead forecasts of the mean vector being Sit+1,j+1|t,j and covariance matrix Pj+1|j . After
observing the information on public signal and individual wage rate at period t+ 1, an
agent updates her belief about Sit+1,j+1, and forms a posterior distribution with mean
vector Sit+1,j+1|t+1,j+1 and covariance matrix Pj+1|j+1
Sit+1,j+1|t,j = FS
i
t,j|t,j (2.8)
Pj+1|j = FPj|jF ′ +Q (2.9)
φit+1,j+1|t,j = y
i
t+1,j+1 − yit+1,j+1|t,j = yit+1,j+1 −H ′Sit+1,j+1|t,j (2.10)
f it+1,j+1|t,j = E
i
t,j [φ
i
t+1,j+1|t,j(φ
i
t+1,j+1|t,t)
′] = H ′Pj+1|jH +R (2.11)
Updating:
Sit+1,j+1|t+1,j+1 = S
i
t+1,j+1|t,j +Kj+1φ
i
t+1,j+1|t,j (2.12)
Pj+1|j+1 = Pj+1|j −Kj+1H ′Pj+1|j (2.13)
3 To simplify for the analysis, we set f(j) ≡ 0 for the rest of the paper.
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where Kj+1 = Pj+1|jHf−1j+1|j is the Kalman gain matrix. Notice that the covariance
matrix evolves independently of the realization of yit,j , and is also deterministic in this
environment since H ′ is deterministic.
Consumers are subject to borrowing constraint a in each period, and one unit of
savings delivers 1/ζj units of assets next period, reflecting the annuity-market survivors’
premium. To write down the value function for individual i, the relevant state variables
are the asset level aij , the log hourly wage I
i
j , and last period’s forecast of the true state
in the current period Sˆij|j−1:
V ij (a
i
j , I
i
j , Sˆ
i
j|j−1) = max
cij ,a
i
j+1,n
i
j
{u(cij , nij) + δζj E[Vij+1(aij+1, Iij+1, Sˆij+1|j)]} (2.14)
subject to
cij + ζ
jaij+1 = (1 + r)a
i
j + exp(I
i
j)n
i
j
aij+1 ≥ a
aiT+1 = 0; c
i
j ≥ 0; nij ∈ (0, 1)
Kalman filter
2.3.2 Equilibrium Definition
A recursive equilibrium in this economy is a set of decision rules for the consumers:
{cij(aij , Iij , Sˆij|j−1), aij(aij , Iij , Sˆij|j−1), nij(aij , Iij , Sˆij|j−1}, aggregate efficient units of labor
N , and the wage rate w on efficient units, such that
1. Given the real interest rate r, and hourly wage, individuals’ decision rules {cij(aij , Iij , Sˆij|j−1),
aij(a
i
j , I
i
j , Sˆ
i
j|j−1), n
i
j(a
i
j , I
i
j , Sˆ
i
j|j−1} solve problem (2.14).
2. Given the wage rate w for an efficiency unit, competitive firms solve the problem
by hiring efficient units of labor n in each period
max
n
pi = y − wn (2.15)
where
y =
∫
A exp(eij)n
i
jdi
and
n =
∫
exp(Iij)n
i
jdi
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3. The domestic labor market clears with w = 1, where aggregate labor demand N
equals the total labor supply from individuals
N =
∫
exp(Iij)n
i
jdi (2.16)
2.4 Model Mechanism: A Stylized Linear Quadratic Frame-
work
In this section, we use a simple quadratic utility function to illustrate the key mechanism
of the baseline model. For simplicity, we abstract from the borrowing constraint and
assume that labor supply is inelastic, we further assume that the time discount rate δ
is the reciprocal of the international gross interest rate 1 + r. Under these assumptions,
the consumer’s problem can be written as:
V ij (a
i
j , I
i
j , Sˆ
i
j|j−1) = max
cij ,aj+1
−(cij − c∗)2 + δ E [V ij+1(aij+1, Iij+1, Sˆij+1|j)]
subject to
cij + a
i
j+1 = (1 + r)a
i
j + exp(I
i
j)
aiT+1 = 0
Kalman filter
This framework is a much simplified version of the full model. However, it highlights
the consumption response to an aggregate TFP shock with Bayesian learning about the
heterogeneous income profiles. With a quadratic utility function and inelastic labor sup-
ply, individuals’ consumption will simply reduce to a fraction of their expected lifetime
income:
cij =
1− δ
1− δT−j+1
[
(1 + r)aij + E
T∑
s=0
exp(Iij+s)
(1 + r)s
]
(2.17)
where Iit,j = ln(At)+β
ij+zit+
i
t is the individual income (we assume inelastic labor sup-
ply here). The present value of expected lifetime income E
∑T
s=0
exp(Iij+s)
(1+r)s is affected by
three factors, the aggregate TFP ln(At), individual income growth β
i, and a persistent
idiosyncratic shock zit. Of these three factors, individual income growth has the most
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persistent effects on the lifetime income, since it accumulates over the life cycle and is
amplified by the age. How persistent the TFP shock comparing to the idiosyncratic
shock zit will depend on their corresponding parameters.
Numerical Example. Assuming the model period is one year, we feed in the param-
eters from [23] and calibrate to some key features on real interest rate and aggregate
TFP, as in Table 2.1. To gain some insight into how the imperfect information and
heterogeneous income profiles might affect consumption volatility, we first study the
impulse response function to a one percent negative TFP shock in Figure 2.2.
Table 2.1: Parameter Values
Description Parameter Value Remark
Discount factor δ 0.96 Real interest rate 4%
Persistence of TFP ρA 0.87 Quarterly autocorr 0.95
Std of TFP σν 0.0107 Quarterly std 0.007
Std of β σβ 0.02 Guvenen and Smith (2010)
Std of η ση 0.19 Guvenen and Smith (2010)
Std of  σ 0.004 Guvenen and Smith (2010)
Persistence of z ρz 0.75 Guvenen and Smith (2010)
Figure 2.2 contrasts the aggregate consumption dynamics in perfect signal case with
the case of no signal on aggregate TFP shock, we also graph the corresponding aggregate
output (y =
∫
At exp(e
i
j,t)di) for comparison. The red square line plots the consump-
tion with no signal of aggregate TFP, the blue dashed line plots the perfect information
case, and the green line shows the corresponding aggregate output. Panel A depicts
the baseline scenario when there are both heterogeneous income profiles (σβ > 0) and
idiosyncratic persistent shock (ση > 0). In response to an aggregate TFP shock, in-
dividuals with perfect information will decrease their consumption, but less than the
output and generally less volatile than the aggregate output out of consumption smooth-
ing motive. On the other hand, individuals lack of information on TFP growth would
attribute part of their income decrease to a lower heterogeneous growth profile, thus
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decreasing their consumption even more. This is because the income growth has a very
persistent effect on their lifetime income. As time goes on, they will update their belief
on individual growth βi, as shown in Figure 2.3. The posterior belief on individual
income growth first decreases on the observation that the income falls below the trend,
and gradually increases as more information is revealed.
Which factor drives the differences in the consumption volatility we see in panel
A of Figure 2.2? Is it because of the heterogeneous income profile or does it come
mainly from a confusion between idiosyncratic income shock and the aggregate TFP
shock? We shut down one of these channels separately in panels B and C. When there
is no substantial differences between individual income growth (σβ = 0), we notice that
there is little difference between the volatility of consumption in perfect signal and no
signal cases. Actually, since individuals assign positive possibility to a less persistent
individual income shock (we assume ρz < ρA here), individuals with information friction
will decrease their consumption even less than the perfect information case initially. This
insight confirms the crucial role that heterogeneous income profile plays in explaining
the excess consumption volatility with imperfect information.
Panel C of Figure 2.2 graphs the situation when there is no individual persistent
shock (ση = 0), here the excess volatility on consumption is amplified comparing to
Panel A. Initially, consumers with information friction will assign positive possibility
on each of the three factors, heterogeneous income growth β, TFP shock ln(At), and
the idiosyncratic shock zit, with decreasing level of persistence. Shutting down the least
persistent effect of zit will bump up the possibility of a low income growth rate, thus
consumption falls more significantly initially. As the learning process goes on, there is
also an obvious overshooting on aggregate consumption when individuals realize that
they save too much earlier, thus the consumption with no signal on aggregate TFP will
generate even higher volatility comparing to Panel A.
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Table 2.2: Simulation Statistics on Relative Consumption Volatility
σ(C)
σ(Y )
σ(C)
σ(Y ) HP-filter
Perfect signal 0.85 0.53
No signal 1.03 0.68
Our simulated results show that the information structure could potentially generate
an excess volatility in consumption, as shown in Figure 2.4. In Table 2.2, the HP-filtered
value of σ(C)σ(Y ) increases by 32% from perfect information on aggregate TFP to no signal
at all.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a framework to explain the key business cycle characteristics
of emerging market economies. We showed that when agents are imperfectly informed
about the aggregate TFP shocks, and they have heterogeneous income growth rates,
they will solve a learning problem using the Kalman filter to estimate the growth rate
of their individual human capital and the growth rate of the aggregate economy. Due to
information frictions, a shock to the growth rate of the aggregate economy will be partly
attributed to the growth rate of agents’ own human capital, the latter of which has more
persistent effects on agents’ life-time income. As a result, the economy features higher
consumption volatility than the output. The key ingredients for these results include the
existence of heterogeneous income growth rates and uncertainty regarding the aggregate
versus individual income growth rates.
Our analysis contributes to the emerging market business cycle literature, which has
largely emphasized the role of financial frictions, terms of trade shocks, and trend versus
growth shocks, but has overlooked the role of information frictions and the underlying
heterogeneous income structures. We fill the gap by introducing another channel of
gradual learning with heterogeneous income profiles that potentially leads to realistic
dynamics of labor supply. Quantitatively, we find that the model can successfully explain
the excessive volatility of consumption and generate a strongly negative correlation
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between the trade balance and output for a wide range of TFP and income processes.
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Figure 2.2: IRF to TFP shock
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Figure 2.3: Posterior of β
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Figure 2.4: Simulation Path of Consumption and Output
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Table 2.3: Moments of Forecast Errors in EMEs and DEs
Country Mean RMSE corr(et+1.t, et,t−1) Dispersion Theill’s U
DCs
France -0.02 0.30 -0.35 0.12 0.36
Italy -0.11 0.39 -0.02 0.15 0.42
Netherlands -0.02 0.36 0.32 0.15 0.25
Spain 0.04 0.15 -0.13 0.10 0.21
UK 0.05* 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.19
Average -0.01 0.27 -0.03 0.12 0.29
Median -0.02 0.30 -0.02 0.12 0.25
EMEs
Argentina -0.57 2.23 0.57* 0.42 0.30
Brazil -0.28* 0.83 0.06 0.43 0.38
Chile 0.10 0.28 0.21 0.17 0.24
China 0.30* 0.55 -0.33 0.39 0.42
Colombia 0.23 0.87 0.03 0.41 0.53
India 0.30 0.85 0.06 0.48 0.44
Indonesia 0.18* 0.43 0.18 0.41 0.36
Hong Kong 0.70* 0.80 -0.16 0.68 0.22
South Korea 0.23 0.86 -0.10 0.31 0.63
Mexico 0.05 0.59 0.31* 0.36 0.27
Peru 0.43* 1.45 -0.13 0.54 0.81
Philippines -0.35* 0.65 -0.13 0.48 0.65
Singapore -0.37* 0.46 -0.21 0.31 0.16
Taiwan -0.16 0.86 0.21 0.61 0.30
Thailand -0.19* 0.42 0.16 0.41 0.29
Turkey -0.13 3.12 0.10 1.07 0.53
Average 0.03 0.95 0.05 0.47 0.41
Median 0.08 0.82 0.06 0.42 0.37
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Appendix A
Data
Care has been taken in this thesis to minimize the use of jargon and acronyms, but
this cannot always be achieved. This appendix defines jargon terms in a glossary, and
contains a table of acronyms and their meaning.
A.1 National Accounts Data
The data sources and sample length of aggregate data on calculating RBC moments
are obtained from OECD and IFS, mostly available from 1981, we summarize the data
sources in Table A.1. Consumption is ”household consumption” and excludes gov-
ernment consumption. When household consumption is unavailable, we use ”private
consumption”, which combines household and non-profit institution consumption. Net
exports is constructed as the difference between exports and imports. The GDP deflator
is used to convert all series into real values.
For Canada, employment is the Canadian Civilian Employment series. To calculate
total hours, we use hours per worker in manufacturing as a proxy for average hours
per worker and scale the employment series accordingly. For Mexico, the quarterly
hours per worker in manufacturing was calculated from OECD data as (total hours in
Manuf)/(total employment in Manuf).
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Table A.1: Data Sources for National Accounts
Country Quarters Sources
DCs
Australia 1979.1-2014.2 OECD
Canada 1981.1-2014.2 OECD
1957.1-1981.1 IFS
Netherlands 1979.4-2014.2 OECD
Spain 1980.1-2014.2 OECD
EMEs
Argentina 1993.1-2014.2 IFS
1980.1-2002.1 Neumeyer and Perri (2004)
Brazil 1991.1-2002.1 Neumeyer and Perri (2004)
South Korea 1979.4-2014.2 OECD
Malaysia 1991.1-2014.1 IFS
Mexico 1991.1-2014.2 OECD
Peru 1990.1-2014.1 IFS
Philippines 1981.1-2014.2 OECD
Turkey 1987.1-2014.2 OECD
